Cryptographic Security of Reactive Systems (Extended Abstract) by Pfitzmann, Birgit et al.
p  
URL  http wwwelseviernllocateentcsvolumehtml  pages
Cryptographic Security of Reactive Systems
 Extended Abstract
Birgit P tzmann Matthias Schunter
 
Fachrichtung Informatik
Saarland University
Saarbr ucken Germany
Michael Waidner
IBM Zurich Research Laboratory
Rueschlikon Switzerland
Abstract
We describe some general relations between cryptographic and abstracted security
de nitions and we present a novel model of security for reactive systems general
izing previous de nitions relying on the simulatability paradigm
The larger context is the goal to provide cryptographic semantics for abstract
speci cations so that the reality of the former can be combined with the brevity
or if a formal language is used the precision and toolsupport of the latter
The novel aspects of our speci c de nition are a separate treatment of honest
users a precise synchronous switching model and easy inclusion of various trust
models We also believe to have the  rst general strategy to deal abstractly with
accepted vulnerabilities such as leakage of trac patterns and the  rst worked
out serioussize examples within a general model Most importantly our model
has the  rst general composition theorem and a link to requirements formulated in
logics
  Introduction
Security proofs for systems involving cryptography are getting increasing at 
tention in theory and practice and they are used for increasingly large systems
While for some time most of the eort concentrated on primitives like encryp 
tion and signature schemes themselves or authentication and key exchange
 
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currently work is under way on entire secure channels fair exchange proto 
cols payment systems and anonymity systems In the future one might want
to prove even larger systems like entire electronic commerce architectures or
distributed operating systems using cryptography
Two communities are working on such proofs and the techniques are al 
most completely disjoint One of our goals with this paper is to show how to
link them and that one actually needs to link them to get the best possible
overall results
We will therefore start with a rather global introduction More closely
related literature is discussed in Section 
   Abstracted Methods
In the formal methods community one tries to use established specication
techniques to specify requirements and actual protocols unambiguously and
with a clear semantics Moreover most work aims at proofs that are at least
automatically veriable and if possible automatically constructed
One always needs some security specic work eg to model an adversary
controlling the network and to formalize specic security requirements in the
given language The earliest work on tool support was rather specic eg the
Interrogator  and the NRL protocol verier 	 while nowadays most work
is based on standard languages like CSP eg 
 or the   calculus  and
general purpose verication tools
Where one aims at tool supported proofs cryptographic primitives are al 
most always abstracted from in a way introduced in 
 
Each cryptographic
operation is treated as a basic operation in an abstract data type or a term
algebra For instance there is a pair of operators E
X
and D
X
for asymmetric
encryption and decryption with a key pair of a participant X The result of
two encryptions of a message m from a basic message space M is not repre 
sented as another message from M  but as the term E
X
E
X
m One then
denes cancellation rules in particular D
X
E
X
t  t for all terms t A basic
assumption for proofs in such a model is that equations that cannot be derived
from the explicitly given ones do not hold Hence in terms of abstract data
types one works in an initial model of the given formulas This model not
only underlies papers like the ones cited above but also the semantics of BAN
logic 

In most other applications of formal methods one does not restrict oneself
to initial models but in security one needs them because one typically wants
to show inequalities eg that the set of messages an adversary can learn does
not contain a certain secret message
A problem with all these models is the missing link between the chosen
abstractions and the real cryptographic primitives as dened and sometimes
proven in cryptography Hence all the techniques even actual proofs in the

Other approaches closer to cryptography are treated in Sections   and  

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Fig 	 Cryptographically secure asymmetric encryption
abstraction no restriction to a nite number of protocol executions etc are
only a way of rapidly discovering some errors with respect to cryptographic
reality We will come back to this with small and made up examples after
presenting a cryptographic denition
  Cryptographic Denition of Asymmetric Encryption
For comparison with the abstraction above let us present the cryptographic
denition of secure asymmetric encryption It comprises adaptive chosen 
message attacks and secrecy of any partial information about the encrypted
message This is the strongest denition considered in cryptography Several
dierent denitions both concerning partial information and active attacks
have all been proven equivalent  Hence cryptographers are quite satised
to have captured the concept adequately Ecient systems provably secure in
this strong sense under reasonable assumptions are known 
One denes an encryption system as a triple of polynomial time algorithms
gen E D where gen and E are probabilistic On input a security parameter
k gen outputs a key pair sk pk E and D are encryption and decryption
and an equation denoting correct encryption is required as above ie for
all key pairs sk pk from the range of gen and all messages from a certain
message space Dsk Epkm  m
For the security one considers the following interaction between an arbi 
trary probabilistic polynomial time interactive adversary A and an attacked
participant Dec decryptor see Figure 

Initially the attacked partic 
ipant generates a key pair and sends pk to A The adversary may then ask
Dec to decrypt chosen ciphertexts c
j
 At some point A instead chooses two
messages m
 

m
 

and Dec encrypts a randomly chosen one of them The
choice is indicated by a bit b ie c  Epkm
 
b


Then A may continue the
chosen ciphertext attack except that Dec now refuses to decrypt the specic

The underlying computational model for both is interactive probabilistic Turing ma
chines  

The choice of two favorite	 messages by the adversary models the secrecy of any partial
information For instance
 if the adversary can evaluate a particular partial information
function on encrypted messages
 eg
 their Jacobi symbol as with pure RSA
 he would
choose m
 

 m
 
 
with dierent values under this function and thus nd out b
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ciphertext c Finally A outputs a bit b
 
as its guess at b
The denition is that the probabilities P
A
k that b
 
 b for such an at 
tacker A and the security parameter k should only be negligibly larger than
 This is called the class   polyk It means that for any poly 
nomial Q there exists a parameter k

  N such that for all k  k


P
A
k 




Qk

The probability is taken over all probabilistic choices of Dec and A in partic 
ular the key generation the probabilism in the encryption function and the
adversarys probabilistic choices
  Comparison
Obviously the denition of asymmetric encryption in cryptography and its
abstraction are not very similar We do not even mainly mean obvious dier 
ences like the explicit restriction to polynomial time adversaries and the error
probability Qkthese are facts from which you might reasonably want to
abstract The main point is that this denition makes no attempt to cover
all inequalities that are assumed in the abstraction it concentrates fully on
knowledge about the cleartext given the ciphertext
For example a protocol might use a hash function H and attach Hm
to a message m for redundancy in an integrity check Then tests of the form
tailm  Hheadm occur where tail extracts the end of the message of
appropriate length for hash values and head takes the rest Now consider the
equation
tailEm  HheadEm
In the abstraction one would certainly not add it to the model because it does
not hold for most encryption systems Nevertheless one can easily construct
some cryptographically secure encryption systems where this equation always
holds Simply take any secure encryption system and augment all ciphertexts c
by Hc It is easy to see that this has no inuence on the security in the cryp 
tographic sense Hc gives no new information about the encrypted message
because it is a function of the ciphertext that the adversary knows anyway
This can be turned into a rigorous cryptographic proof without problems
This example already shows that the abstract model is not necessarily
faithful with respect to the cryptographic semantics of the primitives We
are not aware of a real protocol that fails for such reasons but we have not
searched but one could make up articial ones that do For instance let
us build a ve message fair exchange protocol of a payment promise against
something

First participant X signs a message m

that contains a special

Fair exchange means that either both parties should obtain the others item or none
Here we sketch an optimistic protocol
 where a third party can be called upon in incorrect
protocol runs to restore fairness
 typically if the last messages is not sent
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Fig 
 Faithful abstraction Bold arrows should be de ned once and for all normal
ones have to be provided once per protocol Dashed arrows should then follow
automatically The gray part does not really exist yet
signature test key pk

for this protocol run and says that the promise will
hold if any message of the form mHm is signed with respect to pk

 X
will actually sign such a message m

in the last protocol round In between
however he sends some encrypted value Em

 also signed with sk

 Now
an adversary can use signsk

 Em

 as signsk

m

 because the only test
made on m

is tailm

  Hheadm

 Hence he can hold the honest par 
ticipant to the promise from m

without having sent the message m

that he
was supposed to send before m

for fairness This problem will not be found
in the abstract model
Of course this is a stupid protocol and we have not even worked it out
fully The goal is not to show that something is actually wrong but to
point out that we have no guarantee that it is right in a certain sense that
would be nice to have This is shown in Figure  The top layer shows the
abstraction there are protocols built from abstracted primitives and proven
secure with respect to certain abstract goals The abstract primitives represent
concrete primitives and there should be an unambiguous mapping for deriving
a concrete protocol from the abstract one by replacing the primitives This
is more or less clear in the models mentioned above except for some logics of
authentication We cannot expect the concrete protocol to full the abstract
goals as long as those abstract from error probabilities and computational
restrictions on the adversary which we nd a good thing However we would
like it to full a concrete version of the goals which is automatically derived
from the abstract one by adding similar error probabilities and computational
restrictions This part does not exist yetneither the cryptographic semantics
of general abstract goals nor the proof that the abstract fulls relation
implies the cryptographic one
In the following subsections we discuss previous approaches that can be
seen in relation to the gray part of Figure  We then present as extended
abstract a model that lls some of the existing gaps
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  Other Cryptographic Denitions Relating to Abstractions
For certain primitives the approach from the previous section has already been
taken to some extent Mere integrity primitives like signature schemes and
symmetric authentication codes can be specied quite well in temporal logic
see  such specications where also made in other contexts in particular
rst in 
 The special point in 
 is that a concrete cryptographic
semantics for general linear temporal logic formulas dening safety properties
was sketched in a meta model not a concrete underlying machine model It
was shown that applying this model to certain primitives actually gives the
cryptographic denition and that logic implications can be made and carry
over to the cryptographic layer
Another approach that can be interpreted as basing cryptographic de 
nitions on abstract specications is the simulatability approach at dening
secure function evaluation There the abstract specication is simply a func 
tion f on many inputs x

     x
n
 The goal of the cryptographic protocol is
that each participant provides one x
i
as secret input and they all learn the
result y  fx

     x
n
 but no further information about the inputs of the
other parties It was quite an eort to actually dene what this means in a
cryptographic sense starting with  over approaches that tried to dene the
integrity and privacy of such protocols separately back to formalizations that
more closely resembled the original idea that the protocol should be just as
good as a trusted host that simply computed f for the participants 
This is called the simulatability approach
Our denition follows this simulatability approach extending it to more
general abstract specications More closely related papers that also extend
this approach beyond function evaluation are discussed in Section 
  What does Cryptography Gain from Abstractions
So far we have argued why formal methods could benet from cryptographic
semantics Cryptographers ask the reverse question Arent our mathemat 
ically rigorous proofs better than any abstraction Ie why have an upper
layer in Figure  at all The answer is that indeed one does not gain ex 
pressiveness and the overall results cannot get more rigorous than done by
hand but the specications can get nicer the proofs shorter and tool sup 
port would be easier for those parts of proofs that are accessible to it Indeed
cryptographic denitions are very long that in Section  is one of the sim 
plest and many have been found faulty or at least have been strengthened
later Similarly most proofs are currently actually sketches and again some
have contained gaps This will get much worse with larger systems
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  Formal Methods without Abstraction
Another research direction is to try and express actual cryptographic deni 
tions in formal languages This is almost orthogonal to our own goal which is
to provide a class of abstractions with a general cryptographic semantics Ie
you can have both abstracted and non abstracted denitions in either normal
mathematical or formal languages
For instance  modeling security in CSP and  contain such aspects
or from another direction  More recent examples are 
 Note
however that most approaches in this eld either do not capture the entire
real cryptographic denition eg only dene that many traces should be
compatible with the adversarys view but nothing about the probabilities
or that only the system model is formal while the probabilistic part is still a
special new semantics in normal mathematical language Moreover there is
so far not much tool support in this area in contrast to Section 
Yet another approach is to add details like homomorphic properties of
low level cryptographic primitives pure RSA is not at all a secure encryption
system in the cryptographic sense to the abstract data types from Section 
as initiated in 
 However there is then still an initial algebra semantics
for the properties one has not added which so far has no cryptographic justi 
cation
 Reactive Simulatability Denition
As mentioned above a main hindrance for making abstract security proofs
that are faithful with respect to real cryptographic implementations is that
there is no general notion in cryptography yet for the security of an arbitrary
protocol if secrecy is involved We will provide this for one class of speci 
cations by extending the simulatability denition from function evaluation to
general reactive systems
  Related Work and New Aspects in Our Approach
The rst sketch of a simulatability denition for general reactive systems was
given in  Section  In 	 Section  and also  where such a model
was rst applied to a concrete protocol the authors interpret this as including
the exact simulation of an internal state In contrast we concentrate on
comparison of the interface behaviour ie on possible external observations
of the system This was rst sketched in 
 presented in 

	 A similar
sketch can be found in 
Specic denitions in a similar setting were worked out in 	
 ie
they also rely on simulatability but are hand made for one specic spec 
ication Furthermore due to the specic protocol class considered not all
problems of the general case occur
Detailed general denitions rst exist in  The former are not for
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completely general specications straight line programsthe main goal was
to present a general technique to construct secure protocols for any permitted
specicationand only for information theoretic security in that case the
simpler user model in that paper is probably equivalent to ours below Also
our timing will be dierent In 
 a simulatability denition was given
with   calculus processes instead of the usual interactive probabilistic Turing
machines Unfortunately none of the prior literature not even the well known
papers on simulatability for function evaluation from Section  was cited
While having merits as the rst worked out version with general reactive sys 
tems and the rst with a formal language as machine model the actual de 
nition indistinguishability of two views seems standard to us and not within
the formal system Moreover the specications lack abstraction For instance
the specication of secure transmission of a message in  consists of the pro 
tocol only all encrypted messages are replaced by random messages encrypted
with the same cryptosystem In contrast we aim at specications that are
considerably simpler than the actual protocols and protocol independent
The main novelties of our model are our separate treatment of machines
honest users and adversaries this is already in 
 a precise synchronous
execution model for this case and easy inclusion of various trust models
Further novelties in our work are

We have theorems relating several variants of the denition trying to sort
out which design decisions really change the expressiveness

A composition theorem see Section 

A strategy to deal abstractly with certain non cryptographic imperfections
of most implementations eg the possibility of trac analysis

Serious sized examples fully worked out within a general model see Sec 
tion 

Our current denitions are in a synchronous model of time This can be
seen as a restriction compared with asynchronous models and indeed we rst
did this to avoid the issue of scheduling between adversary and honest users
which is also not fully worked out in any other model we are aware of Of
course this should be future work However we believe that a synchronous
model is not just a weaker version of an asynchronous one but any denitions
should be made for both One reason is that there are many synchronous
protocols around because one can often gain eciency in a synchronous model
Secondly most asynchronous protocols at least need a possibility for user
timeouts in reality anyway Thirdly if one entirely abstracts from timing
eg by assuming that the adversary does it all one cannot discover certain
information leakage resulting from timing In this sense a synchronous model
that imposes strict timing requirements on correct machines and includes
observations of reaction speeds with respect to this scale is closer to reality
We also do not cover dynamic corruptions at the moment

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 Denitions
We now briey go through our basic denitions The underlying machine
model is standard probabilistic extended nite state PEFS machines with a
nite set of in  and output ports formally a pair of a name and a direction
Where computational statements must be made we assume that the machines
are realized by interactive Turing machines and the notion polynomial is
measured in terms of the length of the initial inputs ie the initial content
of the worktape all as in 
De nition  Structures and Systems A cryptographic system Sys is
modeled as a set of structures A structure is dened as a triple MG s
Here M is a set of PEFS machines called correct machines G is a graph on
ports called connection graph and s a set of ports called specied ports All
ports of M should occur in an edge this is wlog Each edge of G connects
one out  and one input port and each input port occurs only in one edge

Each multicast connection contains at least one port from M  s is a subset of
the free ports of G ie those that do not occur in M  These free ports are
denoted freeGM
This is illustrated together with the following denition in Figure 
 Typ 
ically a cryptographic system is described by an intended structure and the
actual structures are derived using a trust model Eg in a multi party proto 
col with honest majority any k  n of the intended machines may be present
in M the others are subsumed by the adversary or in a fair exchange proto 
col the notary and either of the two exchanging parties Similarly the actual
channels are derived from the intended ones depending on whether the in 
tended channels are private private and authentic broadcast etc We have
concrete derivation rules for all these standard trust models but as one can
imagine a wide range of trust models we made the above denition generic
De nition  Con guration A conguration of a cryptographic system
Sys is a tuple MG sHAG
AH
 where MG s   Sys is a structure A
and H are machines modeling the adversary and the honest users and G
AH
is an additional graph with connections only between A and H A and H
should use all ports from freeGM and no ports of A and H should remain
free both wlog
Typically all ports from s are attached to H and all other ports from
freeGM to A ie the honest users use precisely the specied ports and
the adversary the rest eg wiretaps We could actually require this for all
cryptographic examples we have considered so far but not for all examples
from fault tolerance

We nd this model with specic honest users much

Thus there are internal channels among machines from M and connections between M
and an environment Multicast is modeled by several edges from the same output port

We could also add a special free output port guess to A
 which models As knowledge
 and
later include it in the comparison in Denition  But we can show that this is equivalent

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M1 M2 A
G
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s
Fig  Con guration of a system The bold part is the structure
more intuitive than prior models without Honest users should not be modeled
as part of the machines in M because they are arbitrary while the machines
have prescribed programs For example they may have arbitrary strategies
which message to input next to the system after certain outputs They may
also be inuenced in these choices by the adversary eg in chosen message
attacks on a signature scheme therefore the graph G
AH
 Honest users are
not a natural part of the adversary either because they are supposed to be
protected from the adversary In particular they may have secrets and we
want to dene that the adversary learns nothing about those except what he
learns legitimately from the system this depends on the specication or
what the user tells him directly via the graph G
AH

We can show that several dierent versions of the following denition are
equivalent see 
 but we have not found one that does not need a distinc 
tion between specied ports s and other free ports
For a conguration we dene probability spaces on the runs or executions
or traces This would be standard for PEFS machines except for the fact
that adversaries and users cannot be expected to be synchronized with the
system rounds For the adversaries this is the well known model of rushing
adversaries for users it is new As a worst case one might have to dene
that adversaries and honest users carry out an arbitrary dialogue within each
round but we can show that this is equivalent to our following simpler model
De nition  Runs and Views Given a conguration conf and an ini 
tial input for each machine a probability space of runs is dened as follows
Each round i has four subrounds and the switching order isMHAHA
This means that in Subround i the machines fromM and H switch in Sub 
round i the adversary A etc The network transports messages according
to the graph between any two subrounds if H or A input two messages per
round on a channel to M  M receives their concatenation
The view of any subset N of the machines can be described by their initial
inputs the random values they used and the messages they received It is a
random variable in the space of the runs and written as view
conf  in
N where
in denotes the initial inputs The family of these random variables indexed
by in is called view
conf
N
to our simpler denition
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HH
M1,1 M1,2 M2 A2A1
G2G1
struc1 struc2 ∈ f(struc1) ⊆ Sys2
s1 s2 =
s1E
GAH,1 GAH,2
Fig  Simulatability de nition with honest users in the simple case s

 s
 
 The
hatched part denotes the view of H  which should be indistinguishable
In the following we need the cryptographic denition of indistinguishabil 
ity of families of random variables see eg  Perfect indistinguishability
is simply equality computational indistinguishability is quite similar to the
denition of asymmetric encryption The adversary is given an element from
one of the families and should not be able to guess which one
For simplicity we also assume that the initial inputs of all machines are
only a security parameter k The following denition is illustrated in Figure 
De nition  Simulatability Let two systems Sys

and Sys
 
be given
and a function f that maps structures struc

of Sys

to sets of corresponding
structures of Sys
 


For corresponding structures we require freeG

M

 
freeG
 
M
 
  s

 s
 
 ie free ports should only have the same name if they
are supposed to correspond to each other
a We say that Sys

is perfectly at least as secure as Sys
 
i for all congura 
tions conf

 M

 G

 s

 HA

 G
AH 
 with struc

 M

 G

 s

   Sys


there exists a conguration conf
 
 M
 
 G
 
 s
 
 HA
 
 G
AH  
 with the
same user H and struc
 
 M
 
 G
 
 s
 
   fstruc

 such that
view
conf
 
H  view
conf

H
unless H has port names from freeG
 
M
 
 s
 

b We say that Sys

is computationally at least as secure as Sys
 
i the same
as in a holds for polynomial time users and adversaries and with compu 
tational indistinguishability of the families of views instead of equality
Typically Sys

is a real system and Sys
 
an ideal system used as a
specication Formally we make no special requirements on ideal systems
but often each of their structures contains only one machine called ideal
host in cryptography while the real system is distributed
The fact that users H that use ports from freeG
 
M
 
s
 
are excluded is

In cryptographic examples
 fstruc
 
 is typically the set of all structures with the same
specied ports s
 but not in all faulttolerance examples
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where the distinction of users and adversary makes a real dierence It means
that the ideal system may have channels to the adversary and thus make
certain events visible or manipulatable in an abstract way that are not visible
to normal users This allows us to model systems with certain accepted
a priori known vulnerabilities which is important in practice If we would
allow H access there these exact events would have to be indistinguishable
from some events in the real system which would seriously limit the possible
abstraction This should become clear in the following example
	
 Examples and Accepted Vulnerabilities
We have so far worked out two examples in this model in full detail a protocol
for computationally secure private and authentic message transmission and
one for optimistic certied mail The former is similar to examples already
considered with a simulatability approach but not in a general model the
latter is new Both consider an arbitrary number of participants that can
run many instances of the basic protocol because only then typical protocol
failures show up In both cases we have a protocol independent specication
and then a proof for one specic protocol
We can only sketch the rst example here to show how our denition with
honest users permits easy and truly abstract specications in particular in
connection with accepted vulnerabilities as one often nds them in real world
applications See 

 for the second example
The nicest abstract model for secure message transmission would be one
machine that models a perfect network ie users can input messages with
addresses and the messages are delivered precisely to these addresses in the
same order However as also observed eg in  this would not allow
implementations by normal use of encryption even perfect encryption with
one time pads unless one also hides the trac patterns by constantly sending
encrypted meaningless messages link encryption which wastes too much
bandwidth for most applications
Interestingly not even link encryption with one time pads on authentic
channels to avoid destruction of messages is as secure as this nicest ideal
system in the synchronous model In the real system a message between two
honest participants is rst switched by the senders machine then the recip 
ients machine The ideal system must represent the same delay However
an adversary to whom a message is addressed ie he can decrypt it can
obtain it without the delay of his own machine and send an answer back in
the same way Thus the answer arrives two rounds earlier than it would in
the nicest ideal system This is one of the subtleties of the synchronous model
mentioned in Section  that might be abstracted away in an asynchronous
	
It should also become clear in the example that this is not the place for cryptographic
vulnerabilities
 neither unavoidable ones like the very small error probabilities
 nor those
whose absence should be proved

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Fig  A structure of the ideal system for secure message transmission
model but indicates a possible problem with timing in real life One cannot
assume that the honest users have no real time clocks hence such a speed
dierence may lead to dierent user behaviour in the real world
We therefore use the following ideal system as the specication see Fig 
ure 	
De nition  Ideal System for Secure Message Transmission Let a
setMsg of messages of bounded length be given a number rnds of rounds and
a number n of participants and let N  f     ng Then an ideal system
Sys
MT
 
for message transmission is given as follows For any set H  N
of honest participants there is one structure with only one machine called
ideal host IH we omit an index H It has one pair of free in  and output
ports per honest participant and these form the set s of specied ports

Additionally it has four ports for the adversary adv in

and adv out

are for
sending and receiving messages while busy

and suppress

correspond to the
imperfection of the trac In busy

 the adversary gets one bit of information
for each message is transit and with suppress

he can suppress it modeling
that cryptography cannot guarantee availability
We model that in each round i   each participant can send one message
to each other participant Hence in each round i the ideal host IH accepts
inputs of the following form where A  N H
in
i
HN Msg
adv in
i
AH Msg
suppress
i
HH  f g
Here in
i
h  is the vector of inputs at port inh and intuitively in
i
h l is
the message user h wants to send to user l in this round We use  for no
message The switching function is for h l   H and a   A
 
Having free ports in the graph G
 instead of simply leaving some ports of IH free
 may
seem strange here But in a few examples
 the structures specically oer multicast con
nections to their environment
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busy
i
h l 
 


 if in
i
h l  
 else
out
i
h l 
 


 if suppress
i
h l  
in
i
h l else
out
i
a l  adv in
i
a l
adv out
i
h a  in
i
h a
The matrices busy
i
and adv out
i
are output at the corresponding adversary
ports and each vector out
i
 l at port outl
Note how normal messages have a delay of one round while messages to
and from the adversary have not and that busy and suppress are just
 bit signals for each message ie as abstract as possible
We can now see why we have to distinguish the specied ports s and to
forbid H to use ports from freeG
 
M
 
  s
 
in the simulatability denition
We do not want the real system to have ports busy and suppress Instead it
will have normal channels where encrypted messages will pass Hence while
we require that the events at the user ports inh and outh are simulated
indistinguishably we do not require this for the ports busy and suppress
This becomes even more important in a larger example like our certied mail
example where eg one busy signal per protocol run is enough ie we
do not even need one per message This simplies the abstract specication
and enables it to be protocol independent Recall the alternative in 
mentioned in Section 
Scheme  Real message transmission sketch In the actual system
Sys
MT

that we prove to be as secure as the ideal system there is one machine
M
l
per intended user l and all are connected by point to point channels The
actual structures for any subset H of honest participants are derived with a
standard trust model with insecure channels except that authentic channels
are needed for key exchange only used in Round  Only the machines M
h
with h   H are present in M  the insecure channels are split into one channel
to and one from the adversary and the authentic channels get the adversary
as an additional recipient
In each round i   after initial key generation and exchange each
correct machine M
h
transforms its user inputs in
i
h l into network messages
of the following form
netw
i
h l
 


E
l
h sign
h
in
i
h l i l if in
i
h l 	 
 else
E denotes encryption as before and sign signing including the message in
clear The comma denotes tuple composition not concatenation and the
implementation must guarantee unambiguous decomposition
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≥
Real system
SysMT2
Sysprot1
≥
Sysprot2
Design Specification
Sysprot1
SysMT1
Fig  Simplest form of the composition theorem The symbol  stands for at
least as secure as
In each round i   M
h
also decomposes messages netw

i
l h from the
network as follows Let
from
i
l h sig
i
l h D
h
netw

i
l h
or if the decryption or decomposition fails let both components be  Then
out
i
l h 
 


m if from
i
l h  l 
 test
l
sig
i
l h  m i  h
 else
We can prove that this system is as secure as the ideal system Sys
MT
 
if
the encryption system and the signature system are secure under their normal
cryptographic denitions in particular the one shown in Section  Omit 
ting any parameter from the network messages eg the outer h makes the
protocol insecure But of course quite dierent protocols may be as secure as
the same ideal system
 Composition
One of the main advantages of our model is a composition theorem We will
briey sketch what we mean by this and its relation to formal methods

Consider the example of secure message transmission The ideal system
Sys
MT
 
contains no probabilism at all to say nothing of encryption operations
etc It is a very simple non distributed system If a larger protocol Sys
prot

makes use of secure message transmission we therefore want to design it
assuming that the message transmission is done by the ideal system Sys
MT
 

If the protocol uses cryptography in no other form we can therefore design
it without any probabilism etc and thus hopefully in a simple language and
even with the support of standard tools Hence Sys
MT
 
plays the role of an
abstract primitive in Figure 
Now the larger protocol will also have some specication we call this
Sys
prot
 
 It corresponds to the abstract goals in Figure  This is shown in
Figure  Although we also wrote the right part with  denoting at least
  
We have a proof
 but at the time of this writing sketchy
 while the examples sketched in
Section  are fully worked out in 

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as secure as we would hope that the proof does not involve any arguments
with probabilities etc because both systems are deterministic hence it should
be accessible to formal proof methods
What the composition theorem gives us is the left part The real higher
protocol using the real secure message transmission system must be as secure
as its design that used the specication of the message transmission system
Of course the theorem does this generally not only for message transmission
on the lower layer Moreover  is indeed transitive as suggested in the
gure
The theorem can be extended to the composition of several systems and
parallel composition is a special case
Another theorem that we have actually proven is a kind of right part of
Figure  for the case where the abstract goals are not a specication by an
ideal system but by linear time logical expressions over the specied ports
If a system Sys
 
fulls such requirements and Sys

is as secure as Sys
 
with respect to a mapping that keeps the specied ports constant then so
does Sys

 in a well dened notion of computationally fullling linear time
formulas
 Relation to Formal Methods
The main relations to formal methods were already sketched in Section 
Our current specications of abstract ideal hosts are mathematically rigorous
but informal However they clearly lend themselves to a range of normal
specication techniques Then the composition theorem shows ways how to
prove larger systems secure without much special attention to the specic
cryptographic semantics
Our abstractions in the two large examples are on a rather high layer
eg we did not present an abstract model of encryption but immediately of
secure message transmission It will certainly be interesting to see how much
lower one can get or to what extent current cryptographic protocols have to
be and can be redesigned to use only the abstract primitives that do have a
cryptographic semantics Here combinations with some of the less abstract
formalizations mentioned above will certainly be interesting
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